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Abstract 
This paper surveys existing knowledge about how and why industries differ with respect to 
the impact of recessions and credit crunches. While this question is of obvious relevance in 
today’s business environment the relevant knowledge is scattered across several literatures, 
including macroeconomics, finance, industrial organization and strategic management. We 
summarize and integrate this knowledge. Our approach is first to examine what determines 
the cyclicality of demand in an industry, or more precisely, the sensitivity of industry demand 
to negative shocks in aggregate demand. We then move on to examine how the supply side 
responds to these shocks, in particular whether the response is primarily in the form of 
reduced output or reduced margins. Finally, we examine implications for industry 
productivity, both in the short and the longer run.  
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1. Introduction 
Recessions are events that happen periodically in all market economies. Often, but not 
always, reductions in aggregate demand are accompanied by unusual conditions in financial 
markets, where the availability of credit and equity capital is dramatically reduced while 
access to internal finance in the form of retained profit is also below normal.  Such episodes 
have a broad negative impact throughout the economy, but nevertheless, it is also the case that 
the size and nature of the impact differs significantly across industries. The demand for 
pharmaceuticals is quite insensitive to recessions, while the opposite holds for the demand for 
architects. One important question, then, is why demand in some industries is more sensitive 
to aggregate business cycles than in others. Next, a given reduction in demand will in some 
industries lead to a larger change in margins than output, while in other industries the opposite 
will happen. In oil and gas the number of barrels produced will not change much, but the 
margins per barrel will. Conversely, in many software markets the tendency will be that 
margins stay unchanged while volume bears the brunt of the impact.
2
 Our second main 
question, then, is what causes an industry to respond in one way rather than the other. Finally, 
we discuss how recessions impact productivity, which is a major determinant of how quickly 
an industry will recover from a recession. Unfortunately, this last topic will reflect the fact 
that the state of knowledge is much poorer here, particularly with respect to the long run 
consequences, than on the two first questions.  
Before we turn to the substance it is interesting to note that research on variation in 
how industries respond to recessions and credit crunches is almost a byproduct. It is a 
byproduct because very few have shown any interest in the topic per se, and most of what we 
know has been created by researchers that were primarily interested in something else. Much 
of the knowledge has been created by macroeconomists that are essentially interested in 
aggregate, economy-wide effects, but have generated knowledge about industry variation in 
order to understand aggregate effects better. Industrial organization (IO) economists have 
traditionally been more interested in cross-sectional phenomena related to oligopolistic games 
with different structural characteristics, and rarely done the kind of long run panel studies 
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needed to observe industries going in and out of recessions. Nevertheless, important insights 
come from IO. Financial economists have also made important contributions, but again this 
has been because they are interested in understanding something else, specifically the causes 
and consequences of capital structure decisions and imperfections in capital markets - not 
because they are genuinely interested in the topic per se. Finally, one might have expected 
that the strategy literature would have a lot to say on this topic. Surprisingly, the strategy 
literature is almost completely silent on the topic of recessions and business cycles. One 
possible reason is that some highly influential studies have found a very small (average) year 
effect in decompositions of profitability variations (e.g. McGahan and Porter, 1997; 1999; 
2002).  Also, the strategy literature has had its major period of growth after the early 1990s, 
an unusually stable period with only mild recessions. At any rate, the scattered and indirect 
nature of our knowledge seems to make a summary and stocktaking worthwhile. 
Finally, it is also important to point out that this paper is (or tries to be) agnostic on the 
origins of business cycles. We take the existence of shocks to aggregate demand as 
exogenously given, and remain neutral in the battle between Keynesians of various stripes, 
Real Business Cycle Theorists, and others engaged in the quest to explain the fundamental 
causes of recessions. Our agenda is the differences in consequences across industries. 
 
2. Demand Cyclicality 
 
Even the most casual observer of the business cycle will easily observe differences in the 
cyclicality of demand across different industries, and also realize that the size of a negative 
demand shock will be of fundamental importance for the short term consequences a given 
industry will experience. So what causes demand cyclicality to vary? 
Durable vs. nondurable goods 
The strongest finding on this question is that demand for durable goods is far more cyclical 
than the demand for nondurable goods. Estimates indicate that value added in durable goods 
industries is two to three times as cyclical as nondurable goods (Mitchell, 1951; Lucas, 1977; 
Bernanke, 1983; Petersen and Strongin, 1996). There are several reasons for this. A 
fundamental one has to do with stocks and flows. Buyers can be seen as possessing a stock of 
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durable goods. If adverse conditions make buyers want to reduce their stock by just a small 
percentage, this can translate into large reductions in the percentage of current demand. 
Assume that a durable goods industry, say PC-producers, supplies customers that hold a stock 
of 100 PCs. Each year 20 PCs are replaced as they break down or become obsolete. These 20 
new PCs will then represent the annual production of the PC-industry. Assume now that the 
customers want to reduce their stock of PCs by 10%, perhaps because of a 10 % reduction in 
demand and employment in their own markets. This means 10 units less will be demanded, 
which constitutes 50% of the annual PC-demand. So a 10% reduction in the desired stock 
leads to a 50% reduction in current demand.
3
  
A related issue is the fact that the purchase of a durable good is on average easier to 
postpone than a nondurable good. Accounting or dental services can normally not be 
postponed by very much, while the purchase of new furniture or upgrading a PC can. Also, 
since investments in durable goods can be postponed, buyers can benefit from waiting to 
receive more information about how the economy develops. This option value increases 
during downturns (Bernanke, 1983), making demand even more subject to inter-temporal 
substitution. 
A final reason is that demand for durable goods is strongly linked to conditions in 
financial markets. Since buyers consume durable products over several periods, financial 
markets are important for their ability to spread the cost over time. In recessions access to 
external finance from banks and investors is often severely limited or involves increased cost. 
This restricts the opportunities to spread costs over time, and makes buyers depend more on 
internal finance (retained profit). Unfortunately, recessions are also periods with unusually 
low profit levels, so the availability of internal finance is also restricted. In short, demand for 
durable goods becomes depressed by buyers’ access to finance.  
Competition from low cost substitutes 
Going into a recession buyers will on average want to reduce spending. One result of this is 
that they become more willing to switch to low cost substitutes. For example, it has been 
demonstrated that recessions drive up the market share of private labels, while a boom does 
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the same for branded goods (Quelch and Harding, 1996; Lamey, Deleersnyder, Dekimpe & 
Steenkamp, 2007). 
Industries differ with respect to the challenges they face from substitutes, and may 
face competition both from more expensive substitutes and from cheaper ones. The point here 
is that a recession will inflate the threat from the cheaper ones, as buyers’ disposable income 
and willingness to pay for quality drops. So, all else equal, the closer and cheaper the 
substitutes - the larger the negative shift in demand. To illustrate; bottled water faces 
competition from tap water. Tap water is (by and large) a close and cheap substitute. The 
pressure from this low cost alternative will be stronger during recessions than booms. As a 
result, demand in the bottled water industry becomes more cyclical than the market for other 
non-alcoholic beverages (i.e. those that are not faced with an equally close and cheap 
substitute). Note also that some industries may receive a positive demand effect from 
substitution if they are the cheaper substitute. If this effect is strong enough, we say that a 
product or service is an “inferior good”, which means that demand increases as income falls. 
If enough people switch from eating steaks to eating hamburgers during a recession, then 
hamburgers will be an inferior good.   
High growth late in a boom means large contraction early in recession 
If an industry grows fast during the latter stages of a boom this might indicate that a large 
portion of demand receives a marginally sufficient level of utility in the best of times. I.e. 
many customers were nudged into the market on the strength of the unusually good times late 
in the boom. Unfortunately, this means that those marginal customers will probably be quick 
to leave the market again when times become unusually bleak (Okun, 1981; Bils, 1987, 1989; 
Field and Pagoulatos, 1997). The demand for Spa-weekends and personal trainers illustrates 
this. Late in the boom there was a substantial inflow of marginal customers to those markets, 
but those customers were predictably quick to exit again when the recession set in.     
A somewhat paradoxical effect of the current and the previous point is that in many 
industries the demand that disappears first is likely to be the demand from those customers 
that are only marginally better off by being in the market, which are also the ones most likely 
to shop around and compare prices. What this suggests is that during the recessionary period, 
that is, after the marginal customers have exited - the industry as a whole and each firm within 
it might face less elastic demand than during a boom (Stiglitz, 1984). If so, this reduces the 
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incentives to cut margins since the volume gain from doing so will be small. This is probably 
one reason for the finding of countercyclical margins in many industries (higher margins per 
unit in recessions than during booms). We shall return to this point below.  
Ripple Effects 
Ripple effects simply refers to the fact that in business to business markets, your own industry 
might become cyclical even if it does not have any of the properties mentioned above, but is 
supplying an industry that does. Put differently, if your customers face cyclical demand, so 
will you. One reason why architects face cyclical demand, is because they supply services to 
an industry that faces cyclical demand; namely real estate developers.   
Note that these ripple effects will be reduced if the industry (or industries) you are 
supplying has incentives to reduce margins and maintain output high, and worse if it has the 
incentive to respond by maintaining margins and let output fall.
4
 We now turn to those 
conditions that determine the likelihood of either. 
 
3. The Supply Side Response 
 
How will an industry respond to a given negative shift in demand? A crucial question here is 
to what extent it will tend to counter the demand shift by lowering prices and margins, or 
whether it will tend to maintain (or even increase margins) and accept large reductions in 
output. The question of how elastic supply and margins are to changes in demand is of course 
not only relevant during recessions, but an important issue during booms and more normal 
times, too. Many conditions and mechanisms will generally affect how industry output and 
margins are determined. For the moment, however, we shall limit ourselves to those 
mechanisms that have been confirmed, empirically, as important for understanding industry 
responses during recessions.    
The proportion of fixed and variable costs   
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When fixed costs make up a significant share of total cost, firms will be happy to take any 
contribution margin they can towards covering those fixed costs. As long as the margin is 
positive, a firm is likely to be better off by having high output than by having low output. The 
competition among firms to maintain high output will then tend to drive margins down as 
demand weakens. When variable costs are a small fraction of total costs, prices can fall a lot 
before margins turn negative even for the least efficient firm in the industry. On the other 
hand, the more prices are bid down, the more customers will demand. This means that during 
a recession, fixed costs industries will - all else equal - reduce output less than other 
industries, simply because price reductions will counteract the effects of the original negative 
demand shift. In other words; the higher the share of fixed cost, the more margin erosion and 
the less output reduction (Petersen and Strongin, 1996). Shipping can serve as an example of a 
high fixed cost industry, and the reasoning above is an important reason why shipping rates 
can and do fall deeply during recessions. Only after extreme rate drops will capacity be 
moored.  
Conversely, if an industry has a cost structure of mainly variable costs, it will only 
take a small reduction in prices before the least efficient firms will not be able to cover their 
variable cost, and will stop producing. This implies the opposite, larger changes in volume 
and smaller changes in margin.   
Labor Hoarding 
Labor Hoarding means a tendency to keep employees during periods where there is not 
enough work. There are at least two reasons why firms might want to do this. One is that 
labor hoarding during bad times can stimulate the willingness of employees to make firm 
specific investments. Firm specific investments are, of course, less attractive in the eyes of an 
employee the higher the probability of being laid off. The ability to induce such investments 
can increase the efficiency of the firm in the long run, even if it is costly during a recession.  
The other reason is simply that the firm wants to avoid future costs related to search, hiring, 
and training of new employees (Becker, 1962; Oi, 1962; Rosen, 1966). In short, the incentive 
to hoard labor is driven by the need for firm specific investments by employees, and for 
employee specific investments by the firm. Either way, labor hoarding will essentially mean 
that costs become more fixed. This brings us back to the discussion of fixed cost in the 
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previous paragraph, where we concluded that higher cost fixity implies less output reduction 
and more margin cutting. This holds for labor hoarding too (Bernanke and Parkinson, 1991).  
Which industries will be most prone to labor hoarding? This will obviously depend on 
the need to incur firm specific training costs and the costs associated with search, hiring and 
firing. R&D personnel may serve as an example. It is likely that R&D staff must incur firm 
specific investments in knowledge that matches the particular R&D needs of their employer. 
It is also likely that it takes quite some time for R&D personnel to become highly productive, 
and that it takes ongoing investment in training to stay productive. Hence, the firm will make 
specific investments in the employees, too. Finally, given specialized needs, the costs of 
search and hiring may be substantial. This means that R&D intensive industries may be prone 
to hoard labor - R&D labor specifically. More generally, labor economists have found that (in 
the manufacturing sector) nonproduction labor requires more firm specific training than 
production labor, and a stronger tendency to hoard nonproduction labor - though both 
categories may be subject to hoarding (Parsons, 1986). This means that the larger the ratio of 
nonproduction to production labor in an industry, the more labor hoarding one will observe 
(Rotemberg and Summers, 1990). Another indication that adjustment of employment is costly 
is a low level of turnover (in all phases of the cycle).  
Industry concentration 
The more concentrated an industry is, the more likely it is that it displays margins that are 
countercyclical, i.e. margins go up when demand is low, and down when demand is high 
(Rotemberg and Woodford, 1992; Martins and Scarpetta, 1999; Marchetti, 2002). This will 
imply larger changes in output than if margins were procyclical.  The reason for this is usually 
taken to be the following: Concentrated industries are more likely to have collusive pricing. 
When demand is high, the temptation to undercut the collusive price is high, because there is 
a lot of demand to be won. This means that margins will be lower in periods of high demand, 
either to soften the temptation to undercut, or because there will be more undercutting going 
on. In periods of low demand, on the other hand, there is less demand to capture by 
undercutting, so margins can rise (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1986). Note also the earlier point 
that a recession may systematically wipe out the most elastic portion of demand, which 
further contributes towards reducing the volume gains from a price reduction (Okun, 1981; 
Stiglitz, 1984; Field and Pagoulatos, 1997). Finally, the threat from entry is also known to be 
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much lower during a recession. This increases the scope for margin increases without having 
to worry about entry.  
A technical point about countercyclical margins is that increasing margins does not 
have to mean that nominal prices are raised. It suffices that cost reductions and falling input 
prices are less than fully passed on to customers. Also, increasing margins is no guarantee for 
attractive levels of profitability, since it depresses output. The aggregate margin of the 
industry may very well fall, even if the average margin per unit goes up.  
In sum, the more concentrated an industry is, the less margins will tend to be lowered 
in a recession. The more countercyclical the margins, the more procyclical the output (all else 
equal). 
Product differentiation 
Product differentiation means that firms have a degree of market power over their customers. 
This can occur because buyers have heterogeneous preferences and firms are located 
differently in a space of product characteristics (Hotelling 1929; Salop 1979), or because 
buyers incur switching costs once they have started using a particular product (Klemperer, 
1987, 1995). Either way, product differentiation means that each firm faces less elastic 
demand. Less elastic demand implies that the volume response from price and margin 
reductions will be smaller, and hence less tempting, while the opportunity to extract more 
value from loyal customers will be higher and more tempting.  
If, as discussed earlier, there are more customers with elastic demand in the market 
during a boom than during a recession, then margins are more likely to be countercyclical.  To 
illustrate, consider a situation where buyers incur switching costs. In a boom many new 
customers enter the market. These new customers are not yet locked into a relationship with 
any particular supplier, and will accordingly represent quite elastic demand. This gives firms 
an incentive to lower prices and margins during booms to invest in market share building 
since market share is cheaper in such periods. In recessionary periods on the other hand, there 
is less demand from new customers. Demand is in other words more inelastic, and firms shift 
emphasis from market share building towards value extraction from buyers locked in by 
switching costs (Beggs and Klemperer 1992, Klemperer, 1995).  The empirical implication of 
product differentiation is then quite similar to that of concentration; the more differentiated 
the products, the less margins will tend to be lowered in a recession (countercyclical margins 
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more likely). Also, the more countercyclical margins are, the more procyclical output will be 
(all else equal). The software industry (or industries) may serve as an example of an industry 
with considerable learning based switching costs. According to the reasoning here, a recession 
will not lead to much price cutting on software. 
Finance 
Industries differ in their reliance on external versus internal finance. Some industries rely 
heavily on banks for credit (external), while others are able to finance all or most of their 
investments by retained profit (internal). During a recession the ability to obtain external 
finance tends to become more restricted for at least two reasons. One is that the lending 
capacity of banks may be reduced due to (fear of) mounting losses and reserve requirements 
and/or because of a tightening of monetary policy (the bank channel). Another is that a 
downturn in the economy may reduce the value of firms’ collateral (the balance sheet 
channel). The latter means that even banks that are unconstrained will want to cut back on 
their lending (Bernanke and Gertler 1989, 1990).  
Firms and industries that depend heavily on external finance will then face a dual 
challenge.  Access to external finance is reduced at the same time as internal finance in the 
form of profit and positive cash flow is unusually low. The expected result is reduced 
investment and a sharper decline in output growth. Braun and Larrain (2005) examine a 
number of manufacturing industries in 100 countries, over a period of 40 years. They find a 
strong link between an industry’s dependence on external finance and the negative shock to 
output growth during recessions (see Campello and Fluck (2006) for a concurring 
investigation on the firm level). Others examine the effect on pricing and margins. For 
example, Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) and Campello (2003) predict (and find) that 
externally financed firms will invest less in market share building than unconstrained firms, 
and are more likely to boost margins during recessions. At the industry level, the implication 
is that dependence on external finance makes margins more likely to be countercyclical. 
When prices are strategic complements, one firm’s decision to raise its margins creates more 
room for other firms to raise their margins, and the cost of margin hikes in terms of market 
share losses for constrained firms will be reduced, thereby contributing to countercyclical 
margins.  Campello (2003) shows that margins are indeed more countercyclical in high-debt 
industries. 
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Finally, access to external finance during a recession is also likely to be more 
restricted when an industry has many small firms, and when assets have low liquidation value. 
The reason for this is the same as with high debt. Banks and other lenders display a “flight to 
quality” when recession sets in. Quality in this setting means borrowers with a strong balance 
sheet, with asses that can be liquidated easily, and where information asymmetry problems are 
not too large relative to the transaction size. The latter is usually taken to create particular 
problems for smaller firms, since transactions are usually too small to bear large investments 
in screening and monitoring (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1996).   
 
4. Productivity Consequences 
 
We now turn to the productivity consequences of recessions, and how these vary across 
industries. The productivity consequences can be sorted into short- and long run effects. A 
general observation is that while we know quite a bit about the short term effects, there is 
little consensus regarding the long run effects.  
Short run effects 
It is well documented that short term productivity growth is pro-cyclical. It rises in booms and 
falls in recessions (Hultgren & Green, 1960; Hall, 1988, 1990; Basu, 1996). The primary 
cause of this is that recessions lead to reduced capacity utilization (of labor and capital) (Bils 
& Cho, 1994; Burnside, Eichenbaum & Rebelo, 1995). The size of this effect in a particular 
industry will depend on the degree of excess capacity created, and its duration. To understand 
this we must revert mainly to the same variables we discussed above.   
The first and most fundamental factor is of course the size of the negative shift in 
demand. All else equal a larger negative shift means more excess capacity and consequently a 
bigger short term drop in capacity utilization. With respect to the size of the demand shift, we 
refer to the demand drivers discussed in section 2 above. As we recall, important factors were 
durables vs. nondurables, competition from low cost substitutes, inflow of elastic demand in 
the preceding boom, and ripple effects. Also, incentives to maintain high (or even raise) 
margins will tend to depress output and thus capacity utilization, which brings us to the 
mechanisms discusses in section 3 above.  Recall that industry concentration and product 
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differentiation make margins more countercyclical and output more pro-cyclical, and will 
accordingly result in larger negative effects on productivity in the short run. Another factor is 
labor hoarding, which means retaining underutilized labor. This will almost by definition lead 
to reduced labor productivity in the short run, which is consistent with the evidence 
(Burnside, Eichenbaum & Rebelo, 1993; Sbordone, 1997). As we shall see later, some claim 
that labor hoarding may be positively tied to long term productivity growth because the 
hoarded labor switch from producing output to making productivity improvements during a 
recession. For now, we conclude that the more an industry hoards labor, the more short term 
labor productivity will fall. 
How long will a state of low capacity utilization last? To eliminate the initial problem 
demand must either grow or capacity must be reduced (or some combination of the two). The 
development of demand is notoriously difficult to make general statements about, but 
industries with highly cyclical demand will tend to grow more rapidly than others going out of 
a recession. However, these industries also grow from a lower base, since they tend to lose 
more demand going into a recession. It is not possible to say what the net effect of this will 
be. Also, and somewhat paradoxically, positive expectations about demand growth may 
reduce the speed of capacity reductions, as firms - and possibly capital providers- decide to 
ride out the storm instead of making capacity adjustments. Capacity reductions and exit bring 
us over to the long run consequences for productivity. 
Long Run Effects 
There is no agreement about the long run productivity consequences of recessions. Some 
believe that recessions are more or less pure waste (Keynes, 1936; Dickens, 1982), and others 
believe that recessions are crucial tools for long term productivity growth (Schumpeter, 1939; 
Aghion and Saint-Paul, 1996). In spite of considerable amounts of empirical work, there is no 
agreement even about the aggregate effect of recession, and much less on how the long run 
effect varies across industries (Aghion, Howitt, Brant-Collett and García-Peñalosa (1998, Ch. 
8)). One important determinant of productivity is exit. There are two different sets of 
arguments related to exit. One is how fast exit reduces the problems of low capacity 
utilization discussed in the previous section. The other is related to selection, i.e. whether low 
productivity firms are the ones exiting. Below we focus on each of these in turn. 
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The speed of capacity adjustment will depend on the exit conditions within an 
industry. Exit can occur by firms going out of business, by surviving firms consolidating their 
own capacity, or by capacity reducing mergers and acquisitions. The presence of sunk cost 
will work to slow down all three types of exit. Sunk cost is the difference between the value 
of assets in their current and best alternative use. If sunk costs are large, the profitability level 
needed to induce exit is lowered (Eaton and Lipsey, 1980). Put differently; sunk cost implies 
that it takes bigger losses to shut down capacity - and spells of low capacity utilization can 
therefore persist longer. Shipyards are typically quite costly to convert to other uses. This 
slows down yard closings during recessions (but also openings during booms). Industry 
concentration may speed up capacity exit. Removing excess capacity, either by merger or 
otherwise, creates a benefit for the entire industry. The more concentrated the industry, the 
larger the firm’s own share of the benefits from cutting will be. This means that there is a 
potential free rider problem with capacity reduction that diminishes with concentration. 
Differentiation may have a similar effect, but driven by the tendency of each firm to cater to 
its own clientele. Hence, capacity reduction in one niche mainly benefits the firms in that 
niche. This may also reduce the free rider problem of capacity reductions. In the opposite 
direction for firms in both kinds of markets (concentrated or differentiated) is the tendency for 
firms to have comfortable margins to begin with, and be under less competitive pressure to 
take any drastic action. The net effect of this is uncertain.  
Yet another factor is finance. The bigger the problems with access to external finance 
(cf. the discussion above), the quicker the exit process will be. As discussed earlier, small 
firms, firms with high debt, firms making losses, and firms with assets that have low 
liquidation value are especially vulnerable to the “flight to quality” phenomenon. Quick exit 
by such firms reduces the longevity of productivity losses due to low capacity utilization. A 
different matter is whether the selection process works well under these conditions.  
The selection argument is that an industry will tend to come out of a recession with a 
smaller and more productive population of firms than it had before. If recessions 
systematically wipe out the least productive firms, this will be the case. There is indeed 
considerable evidence that low productivity firms are particularly likely to exit during a 
recession (Caballero and Hammour, 1993, 1994; Geroski and Gregg, 1997). This effect may 
be at least partially offset by the fact that creation of new firms is also much lower during 
recession. In evolutionary language this means that there are fewer mutations and the 
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likelihood of finding a successful one is reduced. In terms of productivity the analogy is that a 
reduction in the creation of new firms with new methods - reduces the likelihood of finding 
successful, productivity enhancing innovations. It is also relevant that the selection process is 
myopic in the sense that it works on current performance and not future prospects. Some of 
the low productivity firms that are wiped out in a recession may be firms with good ideas that 
were in transition to become high productivity firms. If such firms lose the battle for survival 
against firms with higher current but lower potential productivity, then long run productivity 
growth will suffer.  
On a related note, it is uncertain how the selection process is influenced by frozen 
credit markets. When banks are in the “flight to quality” mode, they may be less willing to 
fund promising young firms with high growth, high debt and high productivity, and instead 
ensure the survival of large, low growth, low debt, low productivity firms. In fact, Nishimura, 
Nakajima and Kiyota (2005) found a severe breakdown in the selection process during the 
Japanese banking crisis in 1996-97. In about half of the industries they studied - and in total 
for their sample - the exiting firms were more productive on average than the surviving firms. 
In the period before and after the banking crisis the selection process did promote 
productivity, but not during it. 
An important argument for a positive productivity effect is the opportunity cost or pit 
stop model (Hall, 1991; Davis and Haltiwanger, 1990; Aghion and Saint-Paul, 1998). Unlike 
selection models which strictly speaking do not require each firm to improve, the pit stop 
model focuses on improvements within firms. What this model says is that some productivity 
improvement activities will disrupt ordinary production. In a boom, when capacity utilization 
is high, the opportunity costs of making such improvements are high. When capacity 
utilization is low, the opportunity costs are low, i.e. in recessions. This means that recessions 
are periods when productivity improvement activities boom. If so, recessions are crucial for 
future productivity growth. A related variant is called the vintage capital model, which 
emphasizes that during recessions old and outdated technology is scrapped at a faster rate than 
normal, which means that more efficient capital and technology will be used afterwards (see 
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1998) for a review). Empirical support for these ideas has been 
found by Gali and Hammour (1991), Saint-Paul (1993), and Menezes (2005).  
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Critics of the pit stop model claim that it should predict countercyclical productivity, 
while in reality it is well known that productivity is pro-cyclical in the short run (REF). The 
counterargument to this is that productivity improvements may take time to bring to fruition, 
which does seem plausible. Others have countered that the pit stop model exaggerates the 
flexibility firms have in converting labor from producing output to undertake productivity 
improvements, that recessions destroy scale- and learning by doing advantages (Arrow, 1962; 
Stadler, 1990), and last but not least to the well established fact that R&D investments are 
pro-cyclical (Patrick and Lloyd Ellis, 2009). Pro-cyclical R&D indicates that recessions 
impede future productivity growth by shrinking R&D input. 
As stated earlier, empirical research has not been able to settle the argument about 
whether recessions are good or bad for long term productivity. One reason is that it is quite 
challenging econometrically to track the long term consequences of recessions, so there is a 
lot of debate about the validity and interpretation of the evidence that does exist. As one critic 
acidly summarized this literature: “some stories, few facts”. The research on long term 
productivity effects is mostly conducted by macroeconomists. As mentioned in the 
introduction macroeconomists are primarily interested in aggregate effects, and when they 
have not reached agreement about sign and nature of the aggregate effects of recessions, it is 
perhaps not surprising that they have invested limited attention in understanding cross 
industry variation in those effects. The preceding discussion reflects the weak state of 
knowledge on this issue. 
 
5. Knowledge Gaps 
 
There is no shortage of knowledge gaps in the area surveyed here. Let me conclude by 
drawing attention to three of them.  
The first one may be brief. Obviously the confusion over the long run productivity 
effects is an example of a glaring knowledge gap. As noted in the previous section, there are 
models and mechanisms predicting positive long run effects - and others predicting exactly 
the opposite. Presumably there is some truth in all of them, but what is needed from a 
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managerial perspective is an understanding of the conditions that lead one or the other to 
dominate in specific situations, and not which one is dominant in the aggregate. 
A second major embarrassment is the bias in the empirical data underlying this 
literature. Virtually all the existing empirical evidence comes from the manufacturing sector. 
Given the shift towards service industries in the western world this bias is highly regrettable. 
It may, of course, be the case that variation across service industries is explained by the same 
variables that explain variation across manufacturing industries, but very little is known about 
this. Certainly, it is by no means satisfactory to base such a view on mere assumption. There 
may also be important differences within the service sector, such as between high and low 
skill service industries, those exposed to international competition and those that are not, etc. 
In short, we need more data on how service industries are (differentially) affected by 
recessions and credit crunches. 
The third major gap is associated with interactions between the variables we have 
discussed in the preceding pages. What we have done is essentially to make an inventory of 
some important main effects, but there is little systematic knowledge about how these 
variables interact. The reason for this is presumably that such a large proportion of the studies 
is either primarily interested in the aggregate effects (i.e. macroeconomics), or on a specific 
subset of effects - such as capital structure (i.e. finance). Neither motivation is ideal for 
making progress on interaction effects, and it is my belief that serious progress cannot be 
expected to result as a byproduct from researchers primarily interested in something else 
(though this has served us reasonably well in terms of discovering main effects). It will 
probably take a full frontal attack by researchers interested in understanding and predicting 
variation in industry responses to recessions. Hopefully, the current recession will stimulate 
this interest. 
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